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Please Don't Stop the Music: Using the
Takings Clause to Protect Inmates'
Digital Music
ABSTRACT

In prisons across the country, inmates are encouraged to
participatein digital media programs. One in ten correctionalfacilities
in the US has digital media programs in which inmates purchase both
a device-such as an MP3 player or tablet-and content or services for
the device-such as digital music-from a third-partyvendor. Although
fee structures vary, the facility or the state corrections department
usually receives a commission on the revenue generated from inmates'
purchases, thereby profiting off of each purchase that an inmate makes.
As their contracts with third-party vendors end, state correctional
departments may change vendors, either in search of a better program,
a more profitable contract, or other benefits. A change in vendor may
prompt a new policy that strips inmates of their previously purchased
devices and digital purchases, forcing them to repurchase the same
content from the new vendor.
Because their property has been taken by state actors who earn
commissions off of every repurchasedfile, those commissions are used by
the state to fund various state or prisonfunctions, and the prisons do not
fully compensate inmates for the value of their property, some inmates
are considering challenges under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. While the Takings Clause has rarely been used in the
context of digital property, it may offer inmates an opportunity to be
compensated for the millions of dollars they have spent on digitalmedia.
In an increasingly digital world, courts will have to grapple with the
applicationof the Takings Clause to digitalproperty, and this situation
offers an opportunity for them to do just that.
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Scott Larsen's brother was a musician.' Now that his brother is
an inmate, Scott is his sole provider. 2 For seven years, the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC or the "Department of Corrections")
had a contract with Access Corrections, allowing inmates like Scott's
brother to purchase MP3 players and digital downloads of music. 3 The
costs-around $100 for the device and $1.70 for each song-generally
fall on family members like Scott.4 Families of incarcerated people tend
to be low income, so this can be a financial strain.5 Despite the costs,
1.
Ben Conarck, FloridaInmates Spent $11.3 Million on MP3s. Now PrisonsAre Taking
the Players., FLA. TIMES-UNION (Aug.
18, 2018, 5:14 P1VI), https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20 180808/florida-inmates-spent-i 13-million-on-mp3s-now-prisons-are-takingplayers [https://perma.cc/2YPA-KJP6].
2.
Id.
Id.
3.
4.
Id.

5.
BEFORE

ADAM LOONEY &NICHOLAS TURNER, THE BROOKINGS INST., WORK AND OPPORTUNITY
AND AFTER INCARCERATION 2 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-

loads/20 18/03/es 201803 14looneyincarceration-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3D-5D93] ("Boys
who grew up in families in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution (families earning less
than about $14,000) are 20 times more likely to be in prison on a given day in their early 30s than
children born in top-decile families (where parents earn more than $143,000)."); Bernadette Rabuy
& Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-IncarcerationIncomes of the Imprisoned,
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the program has been hugely popular.6 Over the seven years of the
Access Corrections contract, Florida inmates and their families
purchased more than 30,299 players and 6.7 million song
downloads-more than $11 million of music. 7 For Scott, music is a
comfort he can provide his brother in prison.8 For Florida, it is a source
of income: $1.4 million in commissions over the past seven years, with
the residual money not used to run the program going into the state's
general fund, which is controlled by the legislature. 9 As the contract
with Access Corrections ends, Florida has a new vendor in mind: JPay,
an "aspiring 'iTunes of the prison world,"' 10 which currently operates
prisoner bank accounts and phone calls and has expanded into offering
tablets." The tablets offer music purchases and other services
(including emails and educational materials) that represent increasing
opportunities for communication by inmates and for commissions for
the state. 12 Because Florida Department of Corrections policy limits
inmates to one electronic device, the change in vendors means that all
of the Access Corrections MP3 players must be relinquished. 13 As of
January 23, 2019, inmates, including Scott's brother, are not allowed to
keep the MP3 players they purchased, nor can they transfer the music
they purchased onto their new JPay tablets.1 4 Scott will have to

PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html
[https://perma.cc/GW54-JM3E] ("Not only are the median incomes of incarcerated people prior to
incarceration lower than non-incarcerated people, but incarcerated people are dramatically
concentrated at the lowest ends of the national income distribution[.]").
Conarck, supra note 1.
6.
7.
David M. Reutter, FloridaPrisonersGet Tablets, Lose $11.3 Million in DigitalMusic,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/feb/4/florida-prisoners-get-tablets-lose- 113-million-digital-music/ [https://perma.cc/SNT2-7KSY].
8.
Conarck, supra note 1 ("'My brother was a musician, and music is very important to
him,' said Scott Larsen. 'The MP3 player was a good source of entertainment and peace of mind
for him."').
Id.
9.
10.
Adi Robertson, FloridaPrisons Are Getting Sued for Erasing $11 Million Worth of
Prisoner Music Purchases, VERGE
(Feb. 20, 2019,
1:39 PM), https://www.theverge.com/20 19/2/20/182333 17/florida-department-of-corrections-class-action-lawsuit-williamdemler-jpay-mp3-song-access [https://perma.cc/CS3E-67YF].
11.
Conarck, supra note 1.
12.
Id. ("With the introduction of tablets, JPay will add a wide swath of new spending
incentives for its incarcerated customers, offering purchases of music, emailing and other virtual
fare. The resulting download spree will funnel more dollars back to the Department of Corrections,
which.... has already been bringing in record commissions from JPay money transfers, even
before the introduction of the tablets. The agency received $3.9 million in commissions from JPay
account transfers between April 2017 and March 2018.").
Reutter, supra note 7.
13.
14.
Conarck, supra note 1; Reutter, supra note 7.
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repurchase the music library that he helped his brother build before
JPay.15

Inmates have filed hundreds of grievances, including grievances
accusing the Department of Corrections of refusing to facilitate
transfers of the purchased music because it wants to increase its own
profits. 16 It is "not feasible to download content from one vendor's device
to another, not only due to incompatibility reasons, but the download of
content purchased from one vendor to another vendor's device would
negate the new vendor's ability to be compensated for their services,"
wrote the assistant warden, denying a grievance from an inmate who
purchased $2,200 worth of music from Access Corrections.1 7
The Department of Corrections allows inmates to trade their
Access Corrections MP3 player for a mini JPay tablet and a fifty-dollar
credit to buy new music. 18

Inmates have

the option of paying

twenty-five dollars to have their MP3 player unlocked and shipped to a
nonprison address, or to have the music on the device transferred to a
CD and shipped to a nonprison address.19 For inmates and their
families who have spent hundreds or thousands of dollars to have access
to music in prison, and who may be serving life sentences or who are
years or decades away from the possibility of release, this is not an
adequate solution. 20 The MP3 program was allegedly promoted with a
promise that "[o]nce music is purchased, you'll always own it!" 2 1 One
inmate wrote that he purchased 335 songs "under the understanding
that these purchases would belong to me forever." 22 Another wrote, "I
did purchase my MP3 player in order to keep it, and use it until I go
home, not to send it to my family .... [M]y family does not have a use

15.
Conarck, supra note 1.
16.
Id.; Reutter, supra note 7.
17.
Conarck, supra note 1.
18.
Timothy B. Lee, FloridaInmate Says Prison Sold Him $569 ofMusic, Then Took It
Away, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 20, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/02/floridainmate-says-prison-sold-him-569-of-music-then-took-it-away/ [https://perma.cc/T547-9VY2]; Zach
Schlein, Miami Attorney Reps FloridaPrisonersin Class Action over Impounded Music, LAw.COM:
DAILY Bus. REV. (Feb. 20, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2019/02/20/miami-attorney-reps-florida-prisoners-in-class-action-over-impounded-music/
[https://perma.cc/4ANT-RBDC].
19.
Conarck, supra note 1.
20.
Id.; Lee, supra note 18 ("[B]etween 2011 and 2017, FDOC sold nearly 6.7 million
digital media files, at a cost of roughly $11.3 million to prisoners and their families."); Schlein,
supra note 18 ("[The MP3 program] was a way for these prisoners who had life sentences or [sic]
25 years or more ... to have a little slice of normalcy. And to just have it ripped away from them
is completely unacceptable.").
21.
Schlein, supra note 18.
22.
Conarck, supra note 1.
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for such obsolete device, nor do I want it upon my release." 23 The
department's boilerplate reply: it is "aware that family members over
the years have provided funds to their loved ones to add music to their
current MP3 player" and "hope [s] that overtime [sic] the family and the
inmate will see the added value of the new program." 24
In February 2019, William Demler filed the first case
challenging the taking of MP3 players and associated digital content in
the US District Court for the Northern District of Florida. 25 The case is
currently in the pretrial stage 26 and is the first to raise Fifth
Amendment rights of inmates to own digital devices and downloads
that they purchase through the state's contract with private
companies. 27 This Note addresses the digital property rights of
prisoners and the likelihood of a successful takings claim when property
they have been encouraged to purchase is taken by the state. Part I
examines prisoners' property rights, the emerging legal status and
treatment of digital property, and the frameworks that courts use to
decide takings claims. Part II discusses how courts treat inmates'
constitutional claims in general and how courts treat takings claims by
inmates in particular. Part III proposes how inmates could construct a
takings claim to challenge the deprivation of their digital property in
circumstances such as those in Florida to have the best chance of
success in the courts.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW
JPay offers prison services in thirty-five states, with the fee
structure varying by state. 28 In 2016, Colorado became the first state to
provide inmates with tablets, and prison officials now estimate that one
in ten US correctional facilities offers inmates tabletS 29 in states

23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Class Action Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 1-2, Demler v. Inch, No.
4:19-cv-00094 (N.D. Fla. filed Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
26.
Demler
U.
Inch,
PACERMONITOR,
https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/27141776/Demler v INCH [https://perma.cc/XDJ5-6WGK] (last updated Oct. 14, 2019).
27.
Aprevious challenge to a different aspect of a prison MP3 program in Michigan, which
was dismissed, made an antitrust claim. Robertson, supra note 10.
28.
Ben Conarck, Florida Prisons Roll Out More For-Profit Services While Weighing
Visitation Cuts, FLA. TIMES-UNION (June 2, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180601/florida-prisons-roll-out-more-for-profit-services-while-weighing-visitation-cuts [https://perma.cc/A8LZ-RUNZ].
29.
ColoradoInmates'Tablets Taken Away for Security Reasons, DENV. CHANNEL (Aug. 2,
2018, 1:42 PM), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/crime/colorado-inmates-tablets-takenaway-for-security-reasons [https://perma.cc/E9Y7-F9UN] [hereinafter DENV. CHANNEL].
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including New York, Florida, Missouri, Indiana, Connecticut, and
Georgia. 30 Inmates either purchase or are given devices, such as MP3
players or tablets, and then pay for the services. 31 The cost to download
a song, send an email, or video chat with family goes to the private
company the state contracted with. 32 The programs often market
themselves as providing free educational resources and access to law
libraries, 33 promising to improve behavior at no cost to the state. 34 In
fact, states profit enormously from the programs. 35 State prison systems
sign exclusive contracts with prison telecommunications companies
such as JPay and Global Tel Link (GTL), giving inmates only one option
for digital devices and purchases. 36 Many states earn between 10-50
percent of the revenue generated from the inmates' purchases. 37 The
more money spent by inmates sending emails, downloading songs, or
video chatting with their spouse, the more money that goes to the

30.
Michael Waters, The Outrageous Scam of "Free"Tablets for the Incarcerated, OUTLINE
(Aug.
10, 2018, 9:49 AM), https://theoutline.com/post/5760/free-tablets-in-prison-nightmare?zd=2&zi=tyjtro6l [https://perma.cc/4MHY-VG9A].
31.
Conarck, supra note 1 ("For around $100, Access sold various models of MP3 players
that inmates could then use to download songs."); Tonya Riley, "Free"Tablets Are Costing Prison
Inmates a Fortune, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/tablets-prisons-inmates-jpay-securus-global-tel-link/ [https://perma.cc/B5QM-KKFH]
("For $140, prisoners would be able to purchase a clear, 7-inch Android device from JPay. The
tablets wouldn't be connected to the internet, but for a fee, Snitzky and his fellow inmates at
Marion can access emails, games, and music from their prison cells."); Waters, supra note 30 ("In
New York, for example, JPay-which aspires to be the 'Apple of prisons'-gave out 52,000 free
tablets in February 2018.").
32.
Waters, supra note 30.
Both educational materials and legal databases have been criticized for content and
33.
access issues. See id. ("Even the truly free services offered by the prisons, including online libraries
and education programs, have come under fire. Many prisons have scrapped their physical law
libraries, but the online libraries that have replaced them often lack the legal resources inmates
need, according to an investigation by The Crime Report. The legal services offered through the
tablets have also malfunctioned so frequently that countless incarcerated people have been left
without proper legal aid. And those education programs are getting similarly negative reviews.").
34.
See Conarck, supra note 28; see, e.g., GT1 Tablet Solutions, GTL,
https://www. gtl.net/gtl-tablet-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/Z6AV-WPAP] (last visited Oct. 14,
2019).
35.
Waters, supra note 30 ("GTL introduced free tablets in Indiana last year, from which
it expects to make $6.5 million-including a sizable cut, $750,000 per year, for the state. Securus,
meanwhile, has paid out $1.3 billion in commissions to prisons over the last 10 years (a number
that includes commissions for non-tablet programs, including phone calls).").
Conarck, supra note 1; Waters, supra note 30.
36.
37.
These commissions can lead to perverse incentives. See Waters, supra note 30 ("Many
states earn a portion of the revenue generated from prisoners using the tablets, so the incentive is
to pick the company with the highest prices: the more that a telecommunications company makes
off the inmates, the more the prison makes. Prisons earn back anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of
the revenue generated from emails sent by the people they incarcerate.").
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corrections department or state general fund. 38 Although inmates are
encouraged to purchase these devices and digital downloads, it is
unclear what rights they have when prisons revoke the programs and
confiscate their devices because of a security threat 39 or change in
vendor. 40
A. Limits to PropertyRights in Prison
While incarcerated for criminal convictions, inmates retain
some, but not all, of their constitutional protections.4 1 The rights they
retain are subject to certain restrictions justified by the "legitimate
goals and policies of the penal institution." 42 Limitations to inmates'
constitutional liberties may be necessary in some cases for the security
and safety of other inmates, officers, and the institution. 43 Courts grant
"wide ranging deference" to the judgment of prison administrators
when it comes to determining which policies are necessary to maintain
order and security.4 4 However, prisoners retain constitutional rights

that are "compatible with the objectives of incarceration."4 5
The US Supreme Court has recognized property rights of
prisoners 4 6 and the existence of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
protections that "prohibit the government from depriving an inmate of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law."4 7 However, given

reduced expectations of privacy in prison, the Court also held that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to prison cells and to property seized
within them.4 8 As with other constitutional rights, courts balance the
inmate's interest in their property with the "interest of society in the

38.
Conarck, supra note 1 ("In the Access Corrections contract, revenue left over after
paying to run the program went back in a general fund controlled by the Legislature. But in the
JPay contract, the Department retains any excess revenue in its Administrative Trust Fund.").
39.
See, e.g., Reutter, supra note 7; DENV. CHANNEL, supra note 29.
40.
See, e.g., Conarck, supra note 1.
41.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) ("[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all
constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.").
42.
Id. at 546.
43.
Id. at 546-47.
44.
Id. at 547.
45.
VI. Prisoners'Rights,47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1131, 1131 (2018).
46.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) ("Nor does it mean that prison attendants
can ride roughshod over inmates' property rights with impunity.").
47.
VI. Prisoners'Rights,supra note 45, at 1163.
48.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28, 528 n.8, 536 ("A right of privacy in traditional Fourth
Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of
inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.").
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security of its penal institutions."4 9 Broad deference is granted to prison
administrators in the execution of policies and practices that may
infringe on inmates' rights in the pursuit of order and safety. 0
B. Is DigitalMusic Property?
While many people may think about property rights in terms of
real property or personal property with a tangible, physical form, it is
increasingly likely that intangible digital downloads or cloud files are
now types of property as well. 51 This digital property has financial value
from revenue streams to resales: the average US citizen believes their
digital assets are worth $55,000.52 In many ways, the digital assets
people purchase are similar to physical objects. 53 For example, e-books
and digital magazines-in addition to providing the same content as a
physical copy-are displayed on screens with features that mimic their
tangible versions, including the ability to dog-ear or bookmark a page.5 4
However, the purchasers of digital assets may not understand that they
are usually only purchasing a license to use the item on a specific
device.55 Many people may not appreciate the difference between
owning a discrete, physical object and having the license to use the
content on a device, but there are many examples of how these
differences give digital media providers more power than vendors in
traditional marketplaces.56

49.
Id. at 527; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 ("Accordingly, we have held that even when
an institutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First
Amendment, the practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison
administration, safeguarding institutional security.").
50.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47.
51.
Ashley F. Watkins, Comment, Digital Properties and Death: What Will Your Heirs
Have Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 193, 194 (2014).
52.
Id. at 194-95 ("[P]ersonal websites and YouTube accounts can bring in ad revenue
and ... a World of Warcraft character could be sold for thousands of dollars. Even MP3s may have
financial value-especially now that Amazon has been granted a patent that covers a secondary
market for used digital goods. All these assets can really add up. In fact, a recent McAfee survey
found that the average American believed his or her digital assets to be worth about $55,000.").
53.
Caitlin J. Akins, Note, Conversion of Digital Property: Protecting Consumers in the
Age of Technology, 23 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 219-20 (2010).
Id.
54.
55.
Id. at 220; Farhad Manjoo, Why 2024 Will Be Like Nineteen Eighty-Four, SLATE (July
20,
2009,
5:53
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/07/why_2024twill bejlike-nineteen-eightyfour.html
[https://perma.cc/5YSR-SYT6]
("Most of the e-books, videos, video games, and mobile apps that we buy these days day [sic] aren't
really ours. They come to us with digital strings that stretch back to a single decider-Amazon,
Apple, Microsoft, or whomever else.").
Manjoo, supra note 55.
56.
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When Amazon found out that illegal copies of books were being
published on its platform, it removed the digital copies from users'
devices and refunded them what they had paid.57 Critics pointed out

that if a bookstore realized that it had sold bootleg copies of a book, they
could not come into the buyers' homes and remove the books.5 8 Amazon
was sued for this action, and a settlement indicated that they would no
longer delete digital assets from Kindles.5 9 However, this incident
highlighted one of the many ways in which digital property, and the
purchasing or licensing of these assets on digital devices such as tablets
and music players, is a subject of emerging laws governing property.
While legal theorists and state courts advance different theories, many
state laws are moving toward recognition of digital assets as property. 0
1. Legal Theories
It is unclear whether digital property legally exists and, if it
does, what the bounds of that existence are. 61 Some scholars have
suggested that property interests can be disassociated from the physical
object and concern themselves with the information actually
transmitted. 62 The "property- as-information" theory avoids the
impractical distinction between tangible and intangible property, and
thus avoids the problem of a physical dollar bill being treated differently
than a dollar in a bank account. 63 Other scholars define property as
"relations among people with respect to resources."6 4 This rights-based
theory asks "whether the person who wants protection of his or her
rights in a resource or asset has rights in that resource or asset that are
superior to the rights of others."65 This conception also bypasses the

57.
Id.
58.
Akins, supra note 53, at 216 ("One victim noted, 'it's like Barnes & Noble sneaking
into our homes in the middle of the night, taking some books that we've been reading off our
nightstands, and leaving us a check on the coffee table."'); Manjoo, supra note 55 ("When you walk
into your local Barnes & Noble to pick up a paperback of Animal Farm, the store doesn't force you
to sign a contract limiting your rights. If the Barnes & Noble later realizes that it accidentally sold
you a bootlegged copy, it can't compel you to give up the book-after all, it's your property.").
Akins, supra note 53, at 215-17.
59.
See infra Section I.B.2.
60.
61.
Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersingthe Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to Destroy in a New
Era of DigitalProperty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 486-87 (2017).
62.
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 811 (2015).
Id. at 812.
63.
64.
Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of
(In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 134 (2007).
65.
Id.
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tangible-intangible distinctions and the confusion with contracts that
convey rights to intangible assets. 66
There are also scholars who dispute the idea of digital or cyber
property as property.6 7 One criticism is that digital property, such as
digital code, is not "easily analogized to a form of property." 68 For
example, unlike a physical location, "the 'placeness' of cyberspace is a
matter of ongoing social construction," and the law cannot simply apply
property law governing real property to cyberspace. 69 Another critique
is that "digital property is not included in crimes such as larceny
because it is not a 'material object or movement of power' and thus
[does] not fulfill the rigid definition of property."7 0 As a result, someone
who types out a work will "own only the intangible copyright associated
with that work of authorship and have no common law property rights
in the digital file," while a person who writes that same work on a piece
of paper owns both the copyright and the paper itself.7 1
2. Statutory and Case Law
States have begun to recognize digital assets as property in
estate law. 72 In some states, statutes governing digital assets in estate
law apply to emails, in other states it includes documents and
information, and in still others, the law includes access to and control
over social networking profiles. 73 It remains to be seen how some of
these laws will fare against the terms-of-service agreements and
privacy policies of digital life. 74 In an attempt to address the issue of
digital assets in estate law, the Uniform Law Commission created
model legislation, the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital
Assets Act (RUFADAA). 75 RUFADAA has been enacted in forty-one

66.
Id. at 137-38. Moringiello notes that people are often confused by the terms of service
that impose forfeiture of digital assets for noncompliance with the terms, but there is not similar
confusion when the seller of real property imposes restrictions through covenants and conditions
subsequent. Id. at 135-36.
67.
See Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 43-44 (2007).
Id. at 44-45.
68.
Id. at 45.
69.
70.
Michael S. Richardson, Comment, The Monopoly on Digital Distribution, 27 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 153, 157 (2014).
Id. at 158-59.
71.
72.
See Katy Steinmetz, Your Digital Legacy: States Grapple with Protecting Our Data
After We Die, TIME (Nov. 29, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/11/29/digital-legacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/KAL6-ZY3U].
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
75.

REVISED UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015)
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states and the US Virgin Islands, and in 2018 it was introduced and is
currently pending in four states and the District of Columbia.7 6 It
defines a digital asset as "an electronic record in which an individual
has a right or interest."7 7 In the prefatory note, this definition is

described as "ranging from online gaming items to photos, to digital
music, to client lists."78 RUFADAA also notes that the location of the

digital asset "includes any type of electronically-stored information,
such as: 1) information stored on a user's computer and other digital
devices; 2) content uploaded onto websites; and 3) rights in digital
property."79
Although state legislatures are beginning to recognize digital
property, judges and courts have not settled what effect, if any, the
tangibility of property has on its legal status.80 In Dorer v. Arel, the
plaintiff wanted to seize an infringing domain under the law of debt
collection.8 1 The Eastern District of Virginia ultimately used an
alternative method to award control of the domain name to the plaintiff
and did not reach its decision on whether a domain name constituted
property that could be seized under Virginia's law of judgment liens. 82
The court was suspicious about the applicability of judgment liens,
which apply to intangible property, to domain names. 83 The statute
"reaches the debtor's intangible personal property, which includes a
wide range of rights and debts held by the judgment debtor, including
bonds, notes, stocks, debts of all kind, including a debt payable in the
future," and provides for the sale of the intangible property to pay the
creditor.84 In the Dorercase, however, the debtor wanted the intangible
property to be transferred to them, not sold to pay the debt, and the
court was concerned that the intangible property could not be directly

[hereinafter RUFADAA]; FiduciaryAccess to DigitalAssets Act, Revised, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=f7237fc4-74c2-472881c6-b39a91ecdf22 [https://perma.cc/P7KW-AJ36] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) ("This act extends
the traditional power of a fiduciary to manage tangible property to include management of a person's digital assets. The act allows fiduciaries to manage digital property like computer files, web
domains, and virtual currency, but restricts a fiduciary's access to electronic communications such
as email, text messages, and social media accounts unless the original user consented in a will,
trust, power of attorney, or other record.").
FiduciaryAccess to DigitalAssets Act, Revised, supra note 75.
76.
RUFADAA § 2(10).
77.
Id. Prefatory Note.
78.
Id. § 2 cmt.
79.
80.
See supra notes 69-79; infra notes 81-83.
81.
Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 558-59 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Id. at 561.
82.
Id. at 560-61.
83.
Id. at 559 (internal quotations omitted).
84.
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transferred to the creditor under the law 85 and that the intangible
property-the domain name-was controlled by a third-party company,
which compelled a different procedure. 86
Dorer stands in contrast to Kreman v. Cohen, where the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff
had property rights in a domain name under California law.87 The court
applied a three-part test evaluating whether (1) the interest was
well-defined, (2) there could be possession or control, and (3) ownership
was exclusive, and it established that ownership of a domain name was
an intangible property right.8 8 The court went further and applied the
tort of conversion to domain names, although conversion had
traditionally been reserved for tangible property.8 9 The court offered an
example of why the distinction between tangible and intangible
property could lead to absurd results: "It would be a curious
jurisprudence that turned on the existence of a paper document rather
than an electronic one. Torching a company's file room would then be
conversion while hacking into its mainframe and deleting its data
would not."90
The tort of conversion was also applied to electronic records and
data in Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 91 In Thyroff, the
property at issue was business and personal information stored on a
computer system; the system was repossessed by the employer, who
terminated its agreement with the employee. 92 As a result, the
employee was "unable to retrieve his customer information and other
personal information that was stored on the computers." 9 3 The
employer argued that, under New York state law, a conversion claim
could not be "based on the misappropriation of electronic records and
data" because electronic records and data were intangible property.9 4
After examining the history of conversion, the court expanded
conversion to cover digital information, writing, "We cannot conceive of
any reason in law or logic why this process of virtual creation should be
85.
Id. ("Yet significantly, there appears to be no statutory provision for direct transfer of
the judgment debtor's property to the judgment creditor in satisfaction of the judgment. And where
a third party controls the property subject to the writ, a judgment creditor typically must follow
garnishment procedures under Virginia law.").
Id. at 559 n.8 (discussing practical concerns).
86.
Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003).
87.
Id. at 1030.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 1034.
90.
91.
Thyroffv. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1272-73 (N.Y. 2007).
92.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
93.
94.
Id.
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treated any differently from production by pen on paper or quill on
parchment." 95 The court explained that "it generally is not the physical
nature of a document that determines its worth, it is the information
memorialized in the document that has intrinsic value," and concluded
that, unless there was a significant difference in the value or worth of
the information based on its form, "the protections of the law should
apply equally to both forms-physical and virtual."9 6
C. Takings Clause Frameworks
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states, "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation."9 7 A takings inquiry consists of four considerations: (1)
whether the claimant had a property interest, (2) whether the
government's action "effect[ed] a taking of that property interest," (3)
whether the taking was for public use, and (4) whether there is an
adequate provision for just compensation.9 8
The second inquiry-whether there was a taking-does not have
a set formula but attempts to determine "when 'justice and fairness'
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government."9 9 The determination of whether the government's
action was just and fair is an "ad hoc and fact intensive" process, and
different cases have analyzed the claims in slightly different ways.10 0
The Court has identified three significant factors: (1) the economic
impact of the action on the individual, (2) how the regulation has
interfered with their "investment-backed expectations," and (3) the
character of the government's action. 101 When looking at the character
of the action, the Court has explained that it is more likely to find a
taking when there was a physical intrusion by the government, versus
a change in property value as the result of a change in the general
law. 102 The Court also noted that economic harm is not enough on its
own to constitute a taking; the government's actions must "interfere
with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1274-78.
Id. at 1278.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
Id.
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II. DIGITAL PROPERTY, PRISONERS' RIGHTS, AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Both the unique nature of incarceration and the unsettled
questions around digital property affect the scope of constitutional
rights, particularly when it comes to property rights. The following
Sections examine these interactions.
A. PermissibleLimitations on the ConstitutionalRights of Inmates
Prison regulations that infringe on the constitutional rights of
inmates are valid if they are "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests."1 0 4 The courts grant "substantial deference to the
professional judgment of prison administrators" to decide which
restrictions are necessary to the institution, and the burden of proof
falls on the inmate to prove that certain regulations are invalid. 105 The
four factors courts use to determine the validity of prison regulations
affecting inmates' constitutional rights are (1) whether there is a "valid,
rational connection" between the regulation and the state interest; (2)
whether inmates have "alternative means of exercising the right"; (3)
what impact any accommodation would have on prison guards, other
inmates, and prison resources; and (4) whether there is any alternative
"that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to
valid penological interests."10 6 Thus, to assert a due process challenge
to the Florida prison policy-which effectively deprives inmates' digital
files and devices by changing digital music vendors-inmates would
need to assert that the policy is not rationally related to a valid
penological interest. 107
The Court has upheld regulations that are rationally related to
legitimate security concerns, including a ban on inmate-to-inmate
correspondence at different corrections institutions.1 0 8 Other rationally
related restrictions have included limiting visitation of inmates by
children or by former inmates and curtailing contact visits for inmates

103.
Id. at 124-25.
104.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
105.
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
106.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
107.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.").
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
108.
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with multiple substance-abuse violations within the past two years. 109
In contrast, a Missouri regulation that almost completely barred
inmates from getting married was struck down because it was an
"exaggerated response" to valid security concerns about inmate
marriages and because there were "obvious, easy alternatives to the
Missouri regulation that accommodate the right to marry while
imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit of security objectives." 110
Florida created the right to purchase, own, and use digital
devices, but the deprivation of the program is not being used as a
punishment against individuals;1 1 1 the devices are being taken away
from all inmates as a result of the Department of Corrections change in
vendors for the program. 112 Because courts grant broad deference to
prison administrators to decide which regulations are reasonable, 113 the
Department of Corrections has the presumption of reasonability in its
regulation limiting inmates to one MP3 player 14 and in its assertion
that inmates cannot keep the devices they purchased "because the
contract is ending and there would be no way to service them."115 When
a court looks at the four factors established by Turner, the MP3
regulation will survive the first three factors because (1) a regulation
limiting the number of electronic devices is validly and rationally
connected with the state interest in prison safety; (2) the new tablet
program is an "alternative means of exercising the right"; and (3) courts
give deference to the Department of Corrections's assessment of the
impact of having multiple types of devices on the guards, other inmates,
and "the allocation of prison resources."1 16 However, inmates may argue
that the program fails the fourth factor because the alternative does not
"fully accommodate the prisoner's rights" due to the potential loss of up
to thousands of dollars of digital property, 117 though inmates will have
to show that keeping their current device or transferring the
downloaded content to the new device would have "a de minimis cost to
valid penological interests."11 8

109.
110.
111.
(1974).
112.
113.

Overton, 539 U.S. at 133-34.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 98.
This is in contrast to the state-created right in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
Conarck, supra note 1.
Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.

114.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 (2016).

115.
116.
117.
118.

Conarck, supra note 1.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
Id. at 91; Conarck, supra note 1.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
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B. Prisoners'Property Rights and the Takings Clause
While penological interests may justify a deprivation of property
without violating the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause may offer
an alternative remedy. Inmates have substantially litigated takings
claims on the interest earned on inmate trust accounts.11 9 There is
currently a circuit split, with the majority of circuits holding that
"inmates lack the requisite protected property interest for the purposes
of a takings claim" on their inmate accounts. 120 Only the Ninth Circuit
recognizes a property right for inmate accounts. 12 1
In Schneider v. California Department of Correction, a state
statute implicitly denied inmates a property right to interest earned on
their inmate accounts. 122 Because a statutory grant is only one way to
establish a property interest, the court looked to common law. 123 The
Ninth Circuit recognized a property right that could trigger the Takings
Clause via the general common law rule, "interest follows principal." 124
Most circuits have declined to follow this approach. 125 Instead of
looking at the interest follows principal rule, the First, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits refer back to the property rights of inmates at
common law. 126 At common law, inmates "could be forced to forfeit all
rights to personal property." 127 Finding no basis in common law, those
courts then look to statute and to prison policies. 12 8 In Givens, the
Eleventh Circuit found no property interest when the statute was silent
about the ultimate owner of the interest and that, under prison policies,

119.
See infra note 120.
120.
Isaac Colunga, An Alternative Look at the Takings Clause andInmate Trust Accounts,
39 U. TOL. L. REV. 791, 794 (2008); see Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2011); Givens
v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064, 1070 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179,
180-81 (4th Cir. 2000); Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 1995).
121.
Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998); Tellis v. Godinez,
5 F.3d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1993).
122.
Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1199.
123.
Id. at 1199-1200 ("Although an explicit statutory provision may indeed be a sufficient
condition to the creation of a constitutionally cognizable property interest, it assuredly is not a
necessary one. Notwithstanding the State's protestations to the contrary, property rights can-and
often do-exist wholly independently of statutes recognizing them as such." (citation omitted)).
124.
Id. at 1199-1201. Interest follows principal "recognizes that interest earned on a
deposit of principal belongs to the owner of the principal." Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access
to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1996).
125.
Young, 642 F.3d at 54; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 180-81;
Jennings, 70 F.3d at 997.
126.
Young, 642 F.3d at 53; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
127.
Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068; see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
128.
Young, 642 F.3d at 54; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069-70; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
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the inmate "lacks the full rights of 'possession, control, and disposition'
a non-inmate would enjoy." 129 Similarly, in Young, the First Circuit
found no property interest where the statute was silent and the policy
limited what the inmate was able to do with the principal funds in his
account. 130 An earlier policy did give interest earned to the inmate, but
the court said that the previous policy "reflected an act of
administrative

generosity .

.

.. It did not,

however,

obligate

[the

Department of Corrections] to follow that course indefinitely." 1 31
To determine whether an inmate has a property interest in an
electronic entertainment device and in the digital files stored on the
device, courts look to common law, statute, and prison policy. 132 At
common law, inmates could be stripped of all property rights, and so a
court may find that inmates do not derive a property right from common
law. 133 However, this applied to property owned before conviction; there
is no common law right to or denial of property that is acquired after
conviction. 134 State statutes vary; in Florida, the statute is silent about
inmate property but grants broad authority to the Florida Department
of Corrections to adopt rules regarding the rights of inmates. 135
Department rules limit inmates to one MP3 player, 136 and the Florida
Department of Corrections has applied the rules by forcing inmates to
relinquish one device in order to possess a new device. 137 The rules do
not address digital downloads. 138
In Young, the First Circuit specifically addressed a situation
where the policy previously granted inmates a property interest in the
monetary interest from inmate accounts but no longer did. 139 The court
wrote that the policy could be modified or abandoned, but the court only

129.
Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069-70 (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
170 (1998)).
130.
Young, 642 F.3d at 51, 54.
131.
Id. at 55.
See, e.g., Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068-70.
132.
133.
Calero-Toledov. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) ("Forfeiture also
resulted at common law from conviction for felonies and treason. The convicted felon forfeited his
chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his
property, real and personal, to the Crown.").
See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068 (looking at statutory and policy-created property rights
134.
to monetary interest on prison earnings because there was no applicable common law).
135.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.09 (West 2018).
136.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 (2016).

137.
138.
139.

Conarck, supra note 1.
ADMIN. r. 33-602.201.
Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2011).
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addressed property that accumulated after the policy changed. 140 In
Young, the inmate retained ownership of the interest that had accrued
before the policy changed.1 4 1 In contrast, Florida requires inmates to
give up the MP3 devices and the downloaded content they purchased
under the previous policy. 142 However, Florida does offer the inmates
the opportunity to send the device to a nonprison address, presumably
to a family member, so that at least some of the files will be available
to the inmate after their release. 143
C. DigitalProperty and the Takings Clause
While the Court has not heard takings claims for purely digital
property, it has explored the application of the Takings Clause to
various forms of intangible property.1 44 The takings inquiry in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, regarding the public disclosure of intangible
trade secrets, asked four questions: (1) Did the claimant have a property
interest? (2) Did the government's action "effect a taking of that
property interest"? (3) Was the taking for public use? (4) Is there an
adequate provision for just compensation?14 5
Takings claims rely on the money made, or another public
benefit, as a direct result of a deprivation of private property. The state
receives millions from digital purchases by inmates-purchases that
will now be repeated, for even more profit, since the original files were
taken by the prison.1 4 6 The profits are under governmental control for
uses that may support the public good, and the compensation that the
inmates received was only a fraction of both the value of their property
and of the profits paid to the state.14 7 A court conducting a takings
inquiry into intangible digital downloads will likely consider the same
four questions as it has used for other intangible property. 148

140.
Id. ("RIDOC met its obligations under the Policy for as long as the Policy remained in
effect. It accrued interest on inmate accounts until it abandoned the Policy and changed its
preexisting practice. The plaintiff received that interest.").
141.
Id.
142.
Conarck, supra note 1.
143.
Id.
144.
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (citing Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555, 596-602 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)).
145.
Id. at 1000-01.
146.
Conarck, supra note 1.
147.
Infra Sections II.C.3, II.C.4.
148.
See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000-01, 1003 (citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 44, 46;
Radford, 295 U.S. at 596-602; Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579).
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1. Property Interest
For the purposes of takings claims, the Court has held that
property interests are not created by the Constitution but by
independent sources such as state law.14 9 In Ruckelshaus, the Court
held that trade secrets, as an intangible form of property, were
sufficient to form a property interest. 150 In making this decision, the
Court considered whether the owner "protects his interest" from others,
the ways in which trade secrets have "the characteristics of more
tangible forms of property," and the legislation and legislative history
that established the interest. 15 1 The Court also examined its precedent
of recognizing a property interest in intangible property, such as liens
and contracts. 1 52 The Court found that "property" in the Takings Clause
was not limited to a physical object but was used "to denote the group
of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it."153 There was also a statutory
right to exclude, which is a central tenet of property interest.15 4 The
Court held that the claimant had a property right protected by the Fifth
Amendment to the extent that the property right was recognized under
state law.155
To decide whether inmates' digital files constitute a property
interest, the Court examines any state or federal laws that recognize
digital downloads as property. 15 6 State laws generally do not make it
mandatory for digital property to be passed on after death in the same
way that other property is.157 However, states have enacted different
laws that govern the transmission of email and social media accounts,

149.
Id. at 1001.
150.
Id. at 1002.
151.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1560, pt. 5, at 29 (1978) (Conf. Rep.)) ("Even the manner
in which Congress referred to trade secrets in the legislative history of FIFRA supports the general
perception of their property-like nature. In discussing the 1978 amendments to FIFRA, Congress
recognized that data developers like Monsanto have a 'proprietary interest' in their data. Further,
Congress reasoned that submitters of data are 'entitled to'compensation' because they 'have legal
ownership of the data."' (citation omitted)).
152.
Id. at 1003 (citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 44, 46; Radford, 295 U.S. at 596-602; Lynch,
292 U.S. at 579).
153.
Id. (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
154.
Id. at 1011; see also Samuel Mallick, Note, Augmenting Property Law: Applying the
Right to Exclude in the Augmented Reality Universe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1057, 1066
(2017).
155.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
156.
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974); Givens v.
Ala. Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064, 1068 (11th Cir. 2004).
157.
Watkins, supra note 51, at 197-98.
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websites, and digital information after death. 15 8 Courts evaluating a
takings claim also consider whether the owner "protects his interest"
from others, the ways in which digital downloads have "the
characteristics of more tangible forms of property," and any legislation
and legislative history that established the interest.1 59
To the extent that they are able, an inmate may protect their
interest in digital downloads by retaining possession of the device on
which they are downloaded, backing up their data to protect against
loss, and preventing others from deleting their files. Digital downloads,
such as music files, share many of the characteristics of physical forms
of property such as a CD or vinyl record, including storing music and
enabling someone to play music with the associated device. 160 Courts
may also look at precedent where other courts recognized a property
interest, such as in liens and contracts. 161 This area of law is not settled,
with some courts expressing concern about intangible digital property,
like domain names, being property against which a lien may apply. 1 62
Other courts have recognized intangible digital property, such as
information that is stored on a computer, as property to which the tort
of conversion can apply. 1 63
Finally, courts will also consider if and how people possess, use,
transfer, and exclude others from digital downloads. 164 While inmates
are able to possess, use, and prevent other people from using their copy
of a file, their ability to transfer is not as clear. 165 It is unlikely that
inmates have the ability to transfer, given that terms of service
agreements are often part of the purchase of the digital media file and
tend to prohibit the transfer of the file. 166 Further, inmates are
prohibited from selling their belongings to each other, 167 and the files

158.
Access to Digital Assets of Decedents, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/access-to-digitalassets-of-decedents.aspx [https://perma.cc/HM6S-QQPS] (last updated Oct. 14, 2019).
159.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
160.
Akins, supra note 53, at 219-20 (comparing features of digital books to physical
books).
161.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46
(1960); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935); Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)).
162.
See supra Section I.B.2.
163.
See supra Section I.B.2; see, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003.
164.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003, 1011.
165.
Watkins, supra note 51, at 217.
166.
Id. Although they are generally contracts of adhesion, the Supreme Court has upheld
such agreements unless they are substantively unconscionable. Id.
167.
However, inmates who were released while the contract was still valid were allowed
to take the device with them outside of the prison. Lee, supra note 18.
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presumably cannot be easily transferred to devices used outside of the
prison. 168 The biggest challenge to digital assets being recognized as
property in prison may be the inability to transfer.
2. Taking
The Court recognized two ways in which a governmental action
constitutes a taking: (1) "governmental acquisition or destruction of the
property of an individual," and (2) "deprivation of the former owner." 169
While the government's taking ownership or occupancy over property is
the traditional method of a taking, the Court has also held government
actions whose "effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or
most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking." 170 To
decide when a government action exceeds regulation and becomes a
taking, the Court looks at the three Penn Centralfactors: "the character
of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations." 171
All three factors need not apply; in Ruckelshaus, the Court found
that the third factor, "interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations," was so overwhelming as to decide the question. 172 The
Court held that there was no taking when the Ruckelshaus claimants
were "aware of the conditions" under which their intangible property
was shared with the government, those conditions were "rationally
related to a legitimate government interest," and they voluntarily chose
to participate in order to receive "economic advantages." 17 3 However,
when claimants shared data during the years in which there were
statutory protections of their data and requirements for reasonable
compensation, the "explicit governmental guarantee formed the basis
of a reasonable investment-backed expectation."17 4
A governmental action that constitutes a taking can be by
"governmental acquisition or destruction" or by "deprivation." 175 In the

168.
Conarck, supra note 1 (detailing the only transfer option that inmates have during the
change of service provider as an outside entity that saves the files to a disc to be delivered to a
nonprison address).
169.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1004-05 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
170.
Id. at 1005 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378).
171.
Id. (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)) ("[T]hose
factors are: 'the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations."').
172.
Id. (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83).
173.
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1010-11.
174.
175.
Id. at 1004-05 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378).
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context of a digital download, a deprivation is more likely because the
government can easily deprive a person of use of the file but would be
unlikely to need possession of it for its own use instead of simply
acquiring its own copy. 176 However, if the government acted in a way
that "deprive [s] the owner of all or most of his interest," the government
would have effectuated a taking.17 7 The Court looks to the three Penn
Central factors to make this decision: "[T]he character of the
governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations."17 8
For Florida inmates, the government's action completely
deprives them of their digital assets for the remainder of their
incarceration-possibly the rest of their lives. 17 9 The economic impact
on inmates and their families could be considerable; some inmates
spend hundreds or even thousands of dollars on digital files. 18 0 Inmate
labor earns very little money-minimum daily wages average
eighty-six cents-so most of the money in inmate accounts is provided
by their families. 18 1 Inmates tend to come from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds, so the impact of "losing" hundreds or thousands of dollars
can be substantial. 182 As in Ruckelshaus, a court may find that there
was no "interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations"
when the parties were "aware of the conditions" under which they were
purchasing the files, those conditions were "rationally related to a
legitimate government interest"-prison safety and function-and they
had voluntarily chosen to participate. 183 However, in contrast to the
claimants in Ruckelshaus, inmates did not participate to receive

176.
There may be a rare situation in which a recorded image, sound file, or video file is
the only copy of something, but given the current technological ability to copy digital files, it is
unlikely that the government would take complete possession of one.
177.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378).
178.
Id. (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
179.
Conarck, supra note 1. Inmates have the option of paying twenty-five dollars to have
these files transferred to a disc and mailed to an address outside of the prison, so they will only
have access to the files once they are released. Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?,
PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/
[https://perma.cc/T7J4-NYM5] ("The average of the minimum daily wages paid to incarcerated
workers for non-industry prison jobs is now 86 cents, down from 93 cents reported in 2001. The
average maximum daily wage for the same prison jobs has declined more significantly, from $4.73
in 2001 to $3.45 today."); Waters, supra note 30 ("It's prices that are way over market rates, and
it just seems like predatory pricing, just pure profit-seeking .. .. That's money that needs to come
from family members, and usually there's a fee associated with sending it to someone's commissary
account.").
LOONEY & TURNER, supra note 5, at 19.
182.
183.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005, 1007 (quoting PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83).
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"economic advantages" but because it was one of a limited number of
entertainment opportunities in prison.18 4 This inquiry is likely to be fact
dependent and rest on the official prison policy when the purchases
were made and any contract provisions that inmates agreed to when
they purchased the files. 18 5
3. Public Use
A court will rarely question the legislature's judgment regarding
what represents public use. 186 Public use constitutes both a taking "put
to use for the general public" and a taking that has a public purpose.18 7
When the legislative history shows that the purpose of a statute is to
provide a public benefit, as it did in Ruckelshaus, a taking under that
statute is a taking for public use.188
In Florida, the files and devices were taken away because the
state determined that a new vendor would best suit its needs. 189 Any
records about that decision may be helpful for a court to determine
whether the taking was for public use or public purpose. 19 0 In the
original program, which generated $1.4 million, any profits remaining
after expenses went into the state's general fund under the legislature's
control. 19 1 Under the new contract, the Department of Corrections
"retains any excess revenue in its Administrative Trust Fund." 192 This
fund is used for "management activities that are department-wide in
nature." 193 Unlike the state's general fund, the parties may dispute
whether the administrative trust fund is for a public use or a public

184.
Id. at 1007.
185.
See id. at 1010-11 (holding that participation when there was an "explicit
governmental guarantee formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed expectation").
186.
Id. at 1014; see also Cristin F. Hartzog, Note, The "Public Use" of Private Sports
Stadiums: Kelo Hits a Homerun for Private Developers, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 145, 154 (2006)
(quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (" [T]he
Supreme Court declared that 'a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause
as long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.""').
187.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014-15.
188.
Id. ("Congress believed that the provisions would eliminate costly duplication of
research and streamline the registration process, making new end-use products available to
consumers more quickly [and] . . . . would eliminate a significant barrier to entry into the pesticide
market, thereby allowing greater competition among producers of end-use products. Such a
procompetitive purpose is well within the police power of Congress." (citations omitted)).
Conarck, supra note 1.
189.
190.
See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014-15 (relying on legislative history that showed
that the purpose of a statute was to provide a public benefit).
191.
Conarck, supra note 1.
192.
Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.3151(2) (West 2018).
193.
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purpose. The legislative purpose of the Department of Corrections is "to
protect the public through the incarceration and supervision of
offenders and to rehabilitate offenders through the application of work,
programs, and services," so funds that help the department further that
purpose may serve a public purpose.1 94
However, a court may consider whether the commissions that go
into the administrative trust fund are used primarily to fund the tablet
program. The Supreme Court has previously considered whether "user
fees" constitute a taking.19 5 In United States v. Sperry, a corporation
was charged a user fee relating to a settlement that it acquired through
a US-run tribunal. 196 The government charged a reimbursement fee for
the cost of running the tribunal and arbitrating the agreement. 197 The
Court held that the user fee need not be "precisely calibrated" to the
exact cost of the services provided to that party as long as it was a "fair
approximation of the cost of benefits supplied." 198 The Sperry Court
declined to set an exact percentage that would be excessive, but stated
that 1.5 percent was not excessive.19 9 The Court also addressed the
corporation's claims that it was forced to use the tribunal and would not
have chosen to do so, saying that the fee was for the service that was
used and that the corporation "benefit[ed] directly" from that service. 200
Although the exact commission to the Florida Department of
Corrections is not public, a general range of 10-50 percent is common. 201
The percentage is taken out of the money that the inmates spend, and
thus comes from the private contractor's profits, not the inmate's
account. 202 However, inmates could argue that the prices and fees that
they are charged are artificially inflated in order to pay the
commission. 20 3 A court may need to make specific factual findings to
determine what the cost of administering the program was and how

194.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.315(1) (West 2018).
195.
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989); see also Slade v. Hampton Rds.
Reg'I Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 255 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he imposition of a modest and non-punitive charge
to defray costs cannot be said to transgress the state's constitutional obligations.").
196.
Sperry, 493 U.S. at 60.
197.
Id.
198.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463 n.19 (1978)).
199.
Id. at 62.
200.
Id. at 63.
201.
Stephen Raher, You've Got Mail: The Promise of Cyber Communication in Prisons and
the Need for Regulation, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/messaging/report.html [https://perma.cc/5Y6U-5MTX].
202.
Id.
203.
Some of the grievances contended that the explicit reason for the change in vendors
was to increase profits for the department. Id.
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much of the commission goes to public use or public benefit via
state-controlled accounts that are used for state functions. 2 04
4. Just Compensation
For the final inquiry of a takings claim, courts consider whether
there is an adequate provision for just compensation. 205 In Ruckelshaus,
the district court read the statute that allowed for public disclosure of
trade secrets as implicitly preempting the claimant from seeking
compensation under the Tucker Act, which waives sovereign immunity
and provides jurisdiction for claims of monetary damages against the
United States for constitutional violations, including takings claims. 2 06
On review, the Court disagreed, requiring the statute under which the
taking was justified to expressly withdraw the applicability of the
Tucker Act in order to preempt it. 2 07 Because the Tucker Act was
available to the claimant to seek compensation, and had not yet been
arbitrated, there was a possibility of just compensation, and the Court
found that the claim was not ripe for resolution. 208
In Florida, the state may argue that, for the relatively minor cost
of twenty-five dollars, an inmate is able to retain ownership of the files
equal to their ownership of any other property that they are not allowed
to possess or use in the prison, but which will be available to them upon
release. 209 Inmates, however, may argue that they purchased the device
for entertainment use while incarcerated and have no need of it after
release or that they are serving a life sentence and will never be
204.
See Sperry, 493 U.S. at 60 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463
n. 19 (1978)) ("This Court has never held that the amount of a user fee must be precisely calibrated
to the use that a party makes of Government services. Nor does the Government need to record
invoices and billable hours to justify the cost of its services. All that we have required is that the
user fee be a 'fair approximation of the cost of benefits supplied."'); see also Slade v. Hampton Rds.
Reg'1 Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 255 (4th Cir. 2005) (" [T]he imposition of a modest and non-punitive charge
to defray costs cannot be said to transgress the state's constitutional obligations.").
205.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
206.

Id. at 1016-17; see also 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 3657 (4th ed. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2018)) ("The Tucker Act confers
jurisdiction over claims against the United States for money damages 'founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.' In addition to conferring jurisdiction, the Tucker Act waives the
Government's immunity to suit for claims within the grant.").
207.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1017 (quoting Blanchettev. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S.
102, 126 (1974)) ("[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the statute 'expresses an affirmative
showing of congressional intent to permit recourse to a Tucker Act remedy' but 'whether Congress
has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction."').
208.
Id. at 1019-20.
209.
Conarck, supra note 1.
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released. 210 They may also argue that some of the files they purchased
were permanently taken because they could not be sent to an outside
address. 211 Although the devices could only hold a limited amount of
data, inmates "were permitted to delete and re-order digital media files
that they had purchased from the cloud-based library, at any time and
at no additional cost." 212 The digital device user guide "explicitly stated
that prisoners would never have to purchase the same song or book
twice," as they could download previous purchases from the cloud at any
time. 2 13 However, as part of the change from Access Corrections to JPay,
access to the cloud was shut off in January 2018.214 Inmates were given
a January 23, 2019, deadline to relinquish their Access Corrections
digital media players, at which point the device, or the files from the
device that had been transferred to a CD, could be mailed to an outside
address for a fee. 2 15 However, the device or CD could only include the
files currently stored on the device; files in the cloud were permanently
lost. 216

As in Ruckelshaus, the inmates may be able to recover under the
Tucker Act, unless a law explicitly precludes inmates from making
takings claims under the act. 2 17 Inmates are also subject to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and must exhaust their claims through
the administrative grievance procedures set by the institution before
bringing a suit in federal court. 218 Only after an inmate has exhausted
their administrative remedies under the PLRA and any claims they
may have under the Tucker Act will the court consider a takings claim
on its merits.

2 19

210.
See Complaint, supra note 25, at 13.
211.
See id.
212.
Id. at 9.
213.
Id. at 10.
214.
Id. at 12.
215.
Id. at 12-13.
216.
Id. at 13.
217.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016-20 (1984). If the Tucker Act applies,
inmates must exhaust their claim under the Act before they can file a takings claim with the court.
See id. at 1019.
218.
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) § 803, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2018)); Philip
White, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Prison Litigation Reform Act-Supreme
Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 143 (2010).
219.
See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1020 (requiring a claimant to exhaust their claims
under statutory provisions before the matter is ripe for review).
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III. A TAKINGS CLAIM FOR PRISONERS' DIGITAL PROPERTY

Given the responses received by inmates who have filed
grievances in Florida, it seems unlikely that the Department of
Corrections will disturb its new contract with JPay or change its
policies concerning the devices and downloads that inmates purchased
from Access Corrections. 220 One Florida inmate has filed suit and asked
for class action status. 221 After exhausting their other options, other
inmates should file their own takings claims as well. 2 2 2
A. Benefits of a Takings Claim
A takings claim has a number of benefits to inmates whose
devices and digital files have been confiscated as part of a change in
vendors by the Department of Corrections. Given their unique status,
inmates
have
fewer
constitutional
rights
in prison
than
nonincarcerated people do outside of prison, and this can make most
constitutional claims difficult to win. 2 2 3 Additionally, at common law,
inmates forfeit their rights to personal property, 224 and prison policies
limit the amount and types of personal property that inmates are able
to have with them while incarcerated. 2 2 5 Prison policies limit inmates'
constitutional rights, as long as those limitations are reasonable, in
order to meet prisons' institutional needs and purposes of incarceration,
providing prison administrators substantial deference to decide what is
necessary. 226 While inmates retain due process rights, those rights
function differently in the prison context. 227 Inmates may have
procedural due process claims if prison officials take away their digital
devices as punishment, but due process rights are different in situations
like Florida's in which the devices are taken from every inmate
pursuant to changing prison policy. 2 2 8 Courts have considered inmate
takings claims before, and while there are some specific differences in
the way that property interests are evaluated in the prison context, the
220.
See Conarck, supra note 1.
221.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 1-2.
222.
As discussed in Section II.B, there are statutory requirements that must be exhausted
before inmates may file suit.
223.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
224.
Givens v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064, 1068 (11th Cir. 2004).
225.
See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201(4)(a) (2016) (describing the prison
regulations on inmate property).
226.
See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003); VI. Prisoners'Rights,supra note
45, at 1131.
227.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
228.
See id. at 557.
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test for a takings claim is substantially the same for inmates as it is for
nonincarcerated people. 2 2 9

A takings claim is beneficial for ideological reasons because it
will appeal to both liberal and conservative judges. While liberals tend
to support a narrower view of the Takings Clause, the liberal view is
not so narrow as to exclude the permanent loss of what is essentially
personal property by the government. 230 Liberals also are more likely to
support a wide range of prisoners' rights, and as such may be open to
novel constitutional claims by inmates. 231 In contrast to liberals,
conservative judges tend to have a narrower vision of constitutional
rights for prisoners, 232 but conservatives tend to strongly favor property
interests and takings claims that protect those interests in the face of
government appropriation. 233 A takings claim would benefit from the
ideological support of both liberal judges, who tend to support a broader
interpretation of constitutional rights for incarcerated people, and
conservative judges, who favor strong protections and compensation for
people when the government takes their property.
B. Drawbacksof a Takings Claim
There are some weaknesses associated with a takings claim.
Although there is a circuit split, the majority of circuits have taken a
narrow view of the property interests held by inmates, relying on the
common law principle that inmates forfeit all personal property at
conviction. 234 Any claim that rests on establishing a property interest
will first have to convince a court that an inmate can acquire a valid
property interest after conviction and while still incarcerated for their
crime. This postconviction property interest can be shown through
229.
See supra Section II.B.
230.
See Christopher Serkin, The New Politicsof New Property and the Takings Clause, 42
VT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) ("Liberals, on the other hand, favor a narrow view of the Takings Clause.
They reject the category of regulatory takings altogether, or confine it only to those regulatory
burdens that are tantamount to outright expropriation.").
231.
See Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners'Rights, 44
IND. L. REV. 853, 855 (2011) ("In essence, liberal votes and decisions are those that support claims
of rights by prisoners, and conservative votes and decisions are those that endorse the authority
of corrections officials.").
232.
See, e.g., id. at 866 ("Justice Thomas has articulated a new vision of the role of
constitutional rights in corrections, or stated more accurately, the near-absence of a role of
constitutional rights in prisons and jails.").
233.
See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 230, at 4 ("[C]ompeting attitudes toward property have
also resulted in familiar and predictable clashes around the constitutional protection of property
under the Takings Clause. Conservatives favor an expansive reading of the Takings Clause and
would require the government to compensate for most, if not all, regulatory burdens.").
234.
See supra Section II.B.
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common law, state law, or prison policies, but it is a threshold inquiry
for a takings claim that must be proven. 2 35
The ideological beliefs of liberal judges, who tend to favor a
narrow reading of the Takings Clause, should not be too detrimental,
because the actual confiscation of what is nearly physical property is
almost squarely within the Takings Clause. 236 However, the traditional
conservative view on prisoners' constitutional rights cases could be very
difficult to overcome. 2 37 Some of the most conservative justices "reject
nearly every constitutional claim by prisoners." 238 This is not specific to
takings claims and applies to any constitutional claim that a prisoner
may wish to bring, but it forecasts a difficult battle in more conservative
courts that inmates may not be able to win.

C. Establishinga Takings Claim
Although the courts have considered inmate takings claims in
some circumstances, this situation is different, and certain factors
should be considered. 239 The Demler complaint against the Florida
Department of Corrections includes many helpful facts and legal
arguments that other inmates should emulate, but there are also
opportunities for improvement in order to make an even stronger
takings claim. 2 4 0
1. Property Interest
First, the inmate must establish a property interest in the device
and the digital files stored within it. 2 4 1 Although inmates can establish
this interest through common law, state law, or prison policies, the
common law is not particularly friendly to the property rights of
prisoners. 242 If state law is silent on the issue, inmates will have to rely
on prison policies. 2 4 3 The exact policy that was in place at the time the

235.
See supra Section II.B.
236.
See Serkin, supra note 230, at 4.
237.
See Smith, supra note 231, at 855.
238.
Id. at 864.
239.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
240.
Complaint, supranote 25.
241.
This is the first of the four factors that a court uses to analyze a takings claim. See
supra Section I.B.
242.
See supra Section II.B
243.
See supra Section I.B. Florida's current state law does not define the property rights
of inmates. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.09 (West 2018). However, the Department of Corrections has
policies in place about inmate property, including entertainment devices such as MP3 players.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.201 (2016).

150

VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:1:121

inmate acquired the property could offer support on this factor, since
the prisons were encouraging the inmates to purchase from the private
company that the state was contracting with. 2 4 4 According to the Demler
complaint, the Florida Department of Corrections "explicitly promised
that prisoners would own any purchased files forever"-a fact that will,
if substantiated, lend support to a takings claim when the court
evaluates if there is a property interest under the prison's policy. 2 4 5 The
timing of the policy as compared with when the inmate purchased the
device and the digital files may be significant, as courts have treated
takings claims differently depending on what the policy was at the time
the property was acquired. 246 While a policy may be changed, and the
associated rights lost moving forward, inmates may retain rights to
property that they acquired under a previous policy. 2 4 7

2. Taking
Inmates can bolster their claim that their property was taken by
the government by highlighting the physical removal of the device from
their possession, the amount of money they spent on the device and the
digital downloads, and their reasonable expectations of the program
based on the way it was marketed to them. 2 4 8 In Florida, the
Department of Corrections allegedly made explicit promises to promote
the program, including: "Once music is purchased, you'll always own
it!" 24 9 Inmates should stress, as Mr. Demler did, that they relied on this
promise when purchasing the device and digital files. 2 50 Inmates can
highlight the lack of penological purpose to changing vendors and
refuse to transfer the files to support their argument that this was a
taking, not simply a change to facilitate prison safety and order. 251 In
Florida, the previous vendor change to Access Corrections "explicitly
stated that compatibility with the [Florida Department of Corrections]'s

244.
Conarck, supra note 1.
245.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 2.
246.
Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Bova v. City of Medford, 564
F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009); Biggers v. Wittek Indus., Inc., 4 F.3d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 1993)).
247.
Id.
248.
See supra Section II.C; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005
(1984) (explaining the three factors that courts use to determine if the government has
effectuated a taking).
249.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 9.
250.
Id. at 17.
251.
See supra Section II.C. Demler alleges that "for the sole purpose of making its new
vendor contract more profitable for both itself and its vendor, the FDOC instituted and
implemented a formal, statewide policy," but he did not explain why the policy did not support
penological interests. Complaint, supra note 25, at 3.
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prior vendor was a mandatory requirement of the contract, in order to
ensure that prisoners would not bear the cost of the transition between
vendors." 252 If an inmate had knowledge of this previous behavior,
especially if they were an inmate who experienced a change in vendor
without losing their purchases in the past, this information would
strengthen their reasonable expectation claim. If they did not know
about the previous vendor change, inmates should argue that they
reasonably relied on the Florida Department of Corrections's
advertising as Mr. Demler did.2 53

3. Public Use
To prove the third factor, that the taking was for a public use,
inmates can highlight the amount of money from the program that had
gone into the general fund of the state, how much money the state
stands to make from reselling music that has already been purchased
under the original program, and how the future funds in the prison
administrative trust may be used.2 54 Mr. Demler alleges:
From 2011 to 2017, the [Florida Department of Corrections], through its prior
vendor, sold nearly 6.7 million digital media files, at a cost of roughly $11.3 million
to prisoners and their families. The [Florida Department of Corrections] itself
realized approximately $1.4 million in commissions on these sales during the same
2
time period. 55

In order to prove the third factor, inmates will need to be
prepared to show that the commissions the state receives are not simply
a small user fee that is fairly correlated to the cost of administrating
the program but a profit that was used for the public good. 2 56 Mr.
Demler's complaint did not address this issue, nor did it make any
reference to the cost of administering the program, but this additional
allegation should be included to support the takings claim.
4. Just Compensation
To support their claim that there is not an adequate provision
for compensation, inmates will need to explain why the option to send
the MP3 player, or a CD with the files from their MP3 player, to a
relative or friend outside of the prison is not sufficient to compensate
252.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 6.
253.
Id. at 17.
254.
Conarck, supra note 1; see discussion supra Section II.C.3.
255.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 2.
256.
See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989); Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg'l
Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 255 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he imposition of a modest and non-punitive charge to
defray costs cannot be said to transgress the state's constitutional obligations.").
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for the loss. 2 57 An inmate who is serving a life sentence-and who will
thus never be able to reclaim the device since they will never be
released-will have the best argument that sending the device to an
outside address is not compensation at all.2 58 However, any inmate can
explain why waiting years for access to digital files that were purchased
to be used for entertainment within the prison is not satisfactory. 259
Inmates can also discuss the files that will not be sent to an outside
address and are permanently lost. 2 60 Mr. Demler used the life sentence
argument in his complaint, but, because he had no one to send the files
to, he did not address the specific loss of files that were stored in the
cloud. 2 6 1 An inmate who was able to send a CD of files to an outside
address, but who lost a valuable amount of files in the cloud that were
not transferred to the CD, should make this argument.
Finally, in order to overcome potential ideological biases against
inmates' constitutional claims, inmates should emphasize the legal
importance of property and of just compensation when the government
seizes that property. 262 Inmates should explicitly frame the
government's taking of the property-for example, by describing it as
"a direct government appropriation of private property" 263-and should
very clearly enumerate why the compensation offered is not just.2 64
IV. CONCLUSION
Property rights and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
have traditionally applied to real property and to personal property that

257.
Conarck, supra note 1.
258.
See Complaint, supra note 25, at 13 ("As noted above, FDOC prisoners purchased the
digital players and music to listen to them and enjoy them while in prison-notat some unspecified
time in the future. Further, many FDOC prisoners are serving life sentences (or a term so long it
is the functional equivalent of life),or have no family or friends on the outside to whom to send the
player or CD. For these prisoners in particular, the option to mail out the player is completely
illusory.").
259.
See id. They may also cite the Supreme Court's decision that temporary takings by the
government still require compensation for the time period in which the taking occurred. Ark. Game
& Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 33 (2012).
260.
See supra Section II.C.4.
261.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 18.
262.
See supra Section III.A; see, e.g., Complaint, supra note 25, at 22 ("Defendant's
Multimedia Tablet Program has invaded and interfered with Plaintiffs and the putative class's
legally protected property interests.. .. The Multimedia Tablet Program constituted a direct
government appropriation of private property.").
263.
Complaint, supranote 25, at 22.
264.
See supra Section III.C.4 (exploring the impact of the taking on inmates with long or
life sentences and the permanent loss of files stored in the cloud).
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has a tangible, physical form. 2 65 However, as technology evolves and
more things that used to be physical objects develop new forms as
digital downloads or cloud files, the law will need to adapt what it
means to deprive someone of property or take property. Because the
distinctions between tangible property and digital property may cause
some legal uncertainty, 266 the courts and the law will need to evolve and
adapt to the new technological world. By considering how digital
property shares the characteristics of traditionally recognized tangible
property, the law can recognize new forms of property.
Like the rest of society, prisons increasingly rely on different
types of technology to promote prison safety and operations. 267 Inmates
have adapted to these changes, and many have spent hundreds or
thousands of dollars on prison media programs. 268 Although prisoners'
constitutional rights are often limited, they are able to make a takings
claim and should consider making a takings claim in situations like the
one in Florida. 269 Although no court has recognized a taking of inmates'
digital property, by tailoring a claim to the takings claims factors and
showing that prison policies created a property interest, they may be
able to succeed. This could illuminate the prospects of digital property,
and the takings claims that may emerge from them, in our increasingly
digital world.
Amber M. Banks*

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section I.B.
Waters, supra note 30.
Conarck, supra note 1.
See supra Section II.A.
JD Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2020; BA, University of Virginia,
2009. The Author would like to thank her family-Doug, Gloria, Nathan, and Anna Banks-for
their unending love, support, and encouragement in all things. The Author is also grateful to the
entire staff of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law for their invaluable
suggestions and edits.

